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Judging by recent developments, the practitioners of economic fore-
casting should be eligible for hazardous duty pay -- or perhaps the 
working conditions should be subject to the rules governing safety in 
the work place. In any event, the uncertainty attached to making prog-
nostications of the business outlook is far greater than it normally is 
during the forecasting season. 
Nevertheless, several key trends seem to be evident. First and 
foremost is the great likelihood that the pace of economic activity in 
the United States is slowing down. We can debate whether or not we 
technically will be in a recession next year. But what does seem clear 
is that the economy is shifting to a lower gear. Surely we are going 
most of the way to recession, whether or not we technically experience 
two consecutive quarters of negative real growth. From the rapid rebound 
of 8.7 percent in the second quarter of this year, real GNP grew at 
3.4 percent in the third quarter. Gains for the next three quarters are 
likely to be smaller, if any. Thus, the economy is becoming vulnerable 
to recession. Future changes in public policy and the subsequent public 
reaction can easily spell the difference between slow growth and actual 
recession. 
Economic Strengths and Weaknesses 
In making a forecast, it is useful first to briefly examine the strengths 
and weaknesses that now characterize the American economy. The plus factors 
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should not be underestimated. 
1. The continued expansion of personal income. To a significant 
extent, this reflects the positive side of big government. 
The massive infusion of transfer payments is likely to be 
accelerated by a slowdown in the private economy. 
2. The substantial amount of capital spending that is in the 
pipeline. Capital outlay trends, we must realize. are very 
uneven. While business as a whole is planning a modest 10 
percent increase in new plant and equipment next year, aero-
space and fabricated metal producers anticipate increases in 
excess of 20 percent. In contrast, rubber, textile. and food 
processors are cutting back from the 1978 level. All in all, 
about 3 percent real growth in business investment is now 
anticipated for 1979. 
3. The cuts in taxes recently voted by the Congress. A real plus 
was the elimination of virtually all of the misguided attempts 
at closing so-called loopholes and the welcome shift in emphasis 
to promoting investment. 
4. The reduction in our foreign trade deficit. This is resulting 
from a variety of factors, such as the recovery of the Western 
European economies (more exports), the slowdown in our own (less 
imports), and the depreciation of the dollar which occurred 
earlier this year. 
Offsetting these are important negative factors: 
1. First of all is the expected slowdown in monetary growth and 
a further rise in interest rates. Such action, long overdue, 
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is necessary to contain the rising inflationary pressures. But, 
to the extent that restrictive monetary policy succeeds, it also 
tends to adversely affect the real level of output in the economy. 
2. The high level of consumer indebtedness, which may act as a 
brake on future purchases of consumer goods. The data show 
that individual families are not increasing their debt burdens, 
but that more people are going into debt. Installment debt pay-
ments are equal to about 6 percent of disposable personal 
income -- which is not a new record for the American economy 
-- but surely a soft spot in the economy. 
3. The tendency of high interest rates to curb new housing con-
struction. A downturn in new starts is likely in 1979, to 
about 1.5 million from this year•s expected total of approxi-
mately 2 million. High interest rates are discouraging savings 
and loan associations from issuing more certificates based on 
Treasury bill rates. They will be depending more heavily on 
federal housing agencies for their financing, which often is 
a tail-chasing activity. I say this because those off-budget 
agencies in turn get their funds by borrowing in the market in 
competition with the demand for housing and business credit. 
4. The slow growth in productivity. This situation is being 
exacerbated by often needlessly costly government regulation. 
Here, frankly, the Administration seems to be trying to do as 
much as they can within the confines of existing statutes. 
What is needed, of course, is a new law passed by the Congress 
limiting new regulations to those instances where the benefits 
exceed the costs. 
- 4 -
5. The prospect of more 11 jawboning 11 and other federal intervention 
in wages and prices. Controls are not inevitable. Yet, the 
administration seems to be walking down that road, albeit hesi-
tantly and with sincere protestations about not going all the 
way. Meanwhile, the 7 percent pay guidelines of the administra-
tion can be described as based on a 11 lick and a promise ... At 
least half of all workers may be exempt because of the exclusion 
of those earning less than $4 an hour and those covered by 
existing union contracts. Similar constraints do not appear on 
the price side. This means that, were the guidelines to be taken 
seriously, they would lead to a squeeze on profits. For a while, 
large and visible companies are likely to try to avoid public 
confrontations with the Administration. 
Economic Policy Impacts 
Where does all this lead us? I believe that the odds are now increas-
ing for recession sometime in 1979. Although that is no occasion for 
jumping with joy, it does have an obvious positive side: a sustained 
slowdown in the pace of economic activity will help to control the infla-
tion that has become the most serious problem facing the nation. Frankly, 
I do not see much help from the administration's new wage and price program. 
The only truly successful example of jawbone action was reported in the 
Old Testament. Samson, according to the Bible, used the jawbone of an ass. 
Any amelioration of the inflation rate is likely to be temporary or 
accidental. 
Personally, I prefer the more conventional approach of monetary and 
fiscal policy. Frankly, it is perplexing to see the administration 
boasting of getting the federal budget deficit down to 11 0nly 11 $40 billion. 
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When we add at least $10 billion for the so-called off-budget agencies, 
we are talking about a total of Treasury deficit financing in the neigh-
borhood of $50 billion a year. That is not exactly my idea of fiscal 
stringency. Surely, the announced program of budget restraint is commend-
able and should be supported. But we must acknowledge that the bulk of 
the reduction in the estimated deficit for the current fiscal year is 
the almost accidental result of two independent factors: (1) a smaller 
tax cut than was originally proposed and the postponement of its effec-
tive date to January 1 and (2) the inability of the federal agencies to 
spend money as fast as Congress appropriates it (part of that is due to 
the natural tendency to avoid exceeding the Congressionally-mandated 
expenditure targets). 
Fiscal 
1977 
Categorl {Actual} 
Receipts 357 
Outlays 402 
Deficit 45 
Trends in the Federal Budget 
(In billions of dollars) 
Fiscal 1979 Projected 
Fiscal 
1978 
(Estimate} 
400 
450 
50 
Administration•s 
Initial PrOEOSal 
440 
500 
60 
Second 
Congressional 
Resolution 
449 
488 
39 
Moreover, until the international fall of the dollar forced their action, 
the Federal Reserve System was not precisely following a policy of tight 
money. From the third quarter of 1977 to the third quarter of 1978, Ml 
rose by 8 percent. Over the past year, the monetary base has grown even 
faster -- by 9~ percent. It will take some time before that inflationary 
potential works its way through the economy. 
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When we consider all the inflationary legislation and regulation 
enacted and promulgated by the Congress and the administration during 
the past year, it is hard to take them seriously when they turn around 
and ask the private sector to exercise restraint. Current economic policy 
seems to be a classic case of the trite but appropriate statement, 11 Don't 
do as I do, do as I say." 
We should not underestimate the strength of the many inflationary 
forces that are present in the economy: 
1. On January 1, 1979, the statutory minimum wage is scheduled to rise 
by 25¢ an hour. Also effective with the beginning of the year, 
employer payments for social security will rise at a $5 billion 
annual rate. 
2. Another oil price increase by the OPEC nations appears to be in the 
offing. 
3. Wages and fringe benefits are rising at an average annual rate of 
about ~ percent. With productivity up a sluggish 1~ percent, the 
underlying inflationary pressures (in terms of unit labor costs) 
are in the neighborhood of 7 percent -- a very rough neighborhood. 
Moreover, 1979 will be a year when major labor union agreements 
expire, notably the bellwether Teamster's over-the-road contract in 
March. 
4. Inflationary expectations remain high. Unless altered by recent 
policy actions, they will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
What is clearly needed for the economic health of the nation is to 
trim back the size of the public sector. Big government truly needs to 
administer to itself a carefully prescribed dose of self-restraint. 
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Otherwise, aroused taxpayers will force on it a crash starvation diet 
which it would surely deserve. The year 1979 may turn out to be the 
period in which a fundamental change is made. The new trend may occur 
in response to the rising voter resistance to the rising costs of 
government. If the change does occur, the effect will not be felt 
immediately, but the entire public policy process may well shift to a 
lower gear. That is, we will begin to experience slower long-term 
growth rates in government spending and in taxes. 
A shift is occurring in the way that voters are evaluating the 
performance of their elected representatives. No longer is the electoral 
prize going to the candidate who can promise the biggest new spending 
programs. Rather, voters• hearts are being captivated by promises of 
tight budgeting and tax reduction. In a real sense, it is a new way of 
thinking about the public sector that is gaining acceptance among the 
electorate: the notion that, because society's resources are limited, 
government cannot attempt to meet every demand of every group in the nation. 
The newer approach (some might say it really is a return to a way of 
thinking which was more conventional in an earlier age) is not like-ly to 
alter substantially the prognosis for high rates of inflation in 1979. 
But it does contribute to a more positive assessment of the longer-term 
economic outlook. 
Conclusion 
Let me leave you with my fearless forecast for 1979. Year to year, 
real GNP (output after deducting inflation) will be higher next year 
than this year. But the difference is likely to be so small (approxi-
mately 2 percent) that we can have one or two quarters of the year when 
u • 
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the economy does not grow at all or even experiences a downturn. The 
legacy of strong inflationary pressures will produce an average inflation 
rate for 1979 in excess of 7 percent. The slow rate of growth also means 
that not enough new jobs will be created to absorb the growing labor 
force. Thus, the unemployment rate will turn up and will head towards 
7 percent once again. On the other hand, I anticipate that interest 
rates -- which may continue rising through the spring -- are likely to 
be l~wer a year from now than they are today. 
In my foggy crystal ball, we are likely to be looking down into the 
recessionary abyss during much of 1979. It is not written in the stars 
that we will fall in, but the odds now seem to favor it. Nevertheless, 
that is not really bad news for the long term. I say that because the 
seeds are being sown for a brighter outlook in the form of a smaller 
public sector in the 1980s and a new upsurge in private capital invest-
ment that should mean a resumption of greater economic growth on a 
healthier basis -- smaller budget deficits, higher productivity, lower 
interest rates, and less inflation. This optimistic scenario is not 
inevitable either, but the odds here, too, are higher than they were a 
year ago. 
